FFA FISHERIES TRADE NEWS Volume 4: Issue 3 March 2011

 

FFA FISHERIES TRADE NEWS

Volume 4: Issue 3March 2011

By Liam Campling, Elizabeth Havice, Amanda Hamilton and Manleen Dugal[1]

 

CONTENTS

Fisheries Subsidies

Update on fisheries subsidies discussions at the World Trade Organisation

Preferential Trade Agreements

Spanish industry interests continue to attack PNG over global sourcing rule

ATPDEA expires, Ecuador pouch producers loose duty free access to US market

Fisheries Management

International Seafood Sustainability Foundation and Spanish fleet announce partnership

Tuna Markets

Fiji regains access to the EU market

Tri Marine commences fresh tuna exports from American Samoa

Japanese tuna industry and market feel the impact of March tsunami

StarKist faces food safety challenges 

 

Fisheries Subsidies

Update on fisheries subsidies discussions at the World Trade Organisation

The last issue of FFA Fisheries Trade News reported that the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules would intensify discussions on fisheries subsidies in order to generate potential consensus points so that he could produce a revised draft text. Two clusters of meetings were held in March, at the beginning and at the end of the month. Technical and political work was indeed intensified, with sessions on new proposals, including one by the ACP[2] and thematic sessions on major controversial and difficult issues such as subsidies to fuel, high seas fishing, small-scale and artisanal fisheries, where small ‘Contact Groups’ presented their findings. Importantly, these Contact Groups had met several times prior to the clusters and consisted of the more powerful developed and developing Members of the WTO who are deemed to represent the range of different interests in the negotiations. 

By the end of the second cluster in March, however, it was apparent that these Contact Groups had been unable to reach agreement on grounds which might have formed the basis for developing a consensus. On the rules for the treatment of artisanal and small scale fisheries, for example, Members views diverged on whether permissible subsidies for this sector should be provided across the board to all Members, or as special and differential treatment provisions for developing countries only.  Huge differences persisted on the parameters used to define fisheries sub-sectors (i.e. artisanal, small-scale commercial, industrial), with Members exploring a wide range of options including efficiency or capacity of vessels, gear type, the use of technology, catch landing points and catch use, forms of organization of fishermen and area of operation, among others.[3]

On fuel subsidies, most Members reported on two types of fuel subsidy programs – tax exemption programs and price support programs. However, there were huge differences between Members on how such programs were structured and administered, including differences in the policy rationale behind such programs.[4] Differences also existed between Members who believed that disciplines on fuel subsidies were essential to addressing the mandate on overcapacity and overfishing, given that fuel subsidy could be one of the worst kinds from a sustainability point of view, and those who perceived the need for policy flexibility to subsidise fishing operations as global fuel prices continue to be unstable. 

The continuation of deeply entrenched divisions between WTO Members and gaps in their positions make it difficult for the Chair to revise his text. For example, some of the larger developing countries, such as Brazil, keen to enjoy their rights in international fisheries, are ambitious for an outcome that includes flexibilities for subsidizing high seas fishing activities. These Members have expressed the willingness to accept strong fisheries management-related conditionality for subsidized high seas operations including a ‘RFMO-plus approach’ for managing high seas resources.[5] This however, was countered by many ambitious ‘Friends of the Fish’ countries from the other side of the spectrum, including Australia and New Zealand, in whose view, no amount of conditions would be sufficient to negate the adverse impacts of subsidized fishing effort in the high seas, where management was already a significant challenge.  PICs called for the accommodation of special arrangements, such as the FSM Arrangement in the Pacific, where vessels are permitted to fish in a number of EEZs to follow highly migratory tuna stocks. 

More generally, unlike the clusters in February and early March, enthusiasm was at a low, resulting in shortened meetings towards the end of the cluster. The wider dynamic underlying the apparent slow-down of progress on fisheries subsidies is a huge cloud of uncertainty over the future of the Doha Round as a whole – especially around the all-important negotiations on market access for agriculture and industrial goods. It has been reported that key players have advised that the lack of convergence on a consensus would make the drafting of revised texts highly problematic across all negotiating areas as the various Chairs would not be able to bridge the current positional gulfs, including in fisheries subsidies. 

The uncertainty over the future did not deter Egypt and Ecuador from submitting a new proposal on March 28, calling for strengthened provisions for technical assistance to developing countries for meeting future obligations stemming from a potential fisheries subsidies agreement at the WTO.[6] The proposal calls for the establishment of a new Joint Fisheries Management Technical Assistance Mechanism through cooperation between the WTO, FAO, the World Bank, GEF, regional international development banks, and bilateral aid agencies. 

 

Preferential Trade Agreements

Spanish industry interests continue to attack PNG over global sourcing rule

‘Global sourcing’ rules of origin (RoO) for canned tuna and tuna loins have been available to Fiji and PNG since late 2007 under the Interim Economic Partnership Agreement (IEPA) signed with the EU. All parties had recognised that the absence of this concession would have resulted in the collapse of negotiations. In fact, global sourcing was one of the very few tangible gains negotiated in favour of the Pacific ACP and it was provided by the EU as ‘an exceptional concession’.[7] Ever since Lomé I in 1976 the potential of the PACP to benefit from the EU duty preference on canned tuna and tuna loins had been constrained by the lack of RoO-compliant fish available in the region, not least due to the historically very limited presence of EU purse seiners in the WCPO.[8] 

The severe lack of supply of RoO-compliant tuna in the region continued into the 2000s. The EU currently maintains three Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) in the region – with FSM, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands – but only four EU-flagged purse seiners were recorded on the FFA vessel registry in 2010. All four of these boats undertake the majority of their fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific to supply processing facilities based in Latin America. Similarly, there have been no serious attempts by Spanish interests to invest in the Pacific islands. Instead, Spanish investment in lower-cost locations for the processing of tuna has concentrated in Latin America.[9]

Compared to most Latin American countries, PNG is highly undeveloped. The economy is not diversified and diseconomies of scale contribute to internationally non-competitive costs of doing business.[10] By all accounts, PNG is one of the poorest and most economically vulnerable countries in the world. 

Despite these facts, the Spanish National Association of Fish and Shellfish Canners (ANFACO) and the European tuna industry lobby Eurothon continue to deepen their attacks against the global sourcing rule.[11] Eurothon alleges that PNG ‘“is a hotbed of illegal fishing”’.[12] ANFACO argues that PNG is acting as a sinister conduit for the activities of non-European multinational corporations;[13] despite, of course, that historically and today many tuna processing facilities exporting under ACP and GSP+ preferences have been controlled by large non-European multinational firms.[14] 

On the contrary, instead of PNG being a source of IUU fish, the final assessment of an EU-commissioned study on compliance with the EU IUU regulation found that PNG was a top performer. The National Fisheries Authorities (NFA) catch compliance systems were commended and the consultant credited the NFA for having one of the strongest weight validation and verification systems in the world, giving a high confidence in PNG product traceability.[15] 

PNG is in fact a relatively minor supplier of canned tuna to importers in the EU (it was not even in the top 13 in 2009), especially compared to other players such as Spain itself (which was the leader in the EU import market 2009 with 14.1%), Ecuador (12.2%), Thailand (12%) and the Philippines (10.3%).[16] Despite this ANFACO insists on singling out PNG as the most “serious threat” to Spanish industry,[17] a position that was mirrored in an ‘exploratory opinion’ on the matter by the European Economic and Social Committee.[18] Most recently, ANFACO is reported to be examining whether PNG exporters are in violation of EU anti-dumping law on the grounds that they are using IUU fish and not complying with sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures.[19]

ANFACO has been supported politically by members of the European Parliament, especially in the Committee on Fisheries.[20] A recent report by this Committee called global sourcing a ‘totally outrageous exemption’ that has, apparently, led to new canneries that have been ‘hastily set up’ and ‘employ mostly Asian staff’, which has ‘caused considerable disruption to the [EU] canned tuna market’.[21] However, investment in tuna processing capacity in PNG since the granting of global sourcing is not yet operational and almost all staff employed are PNG nationals, so the claims of market ‘disruption’ can be baldly discounted. As pointed out by the EU’s Trade Commissioner, Krael De Gucht, ‘the idea that [the EU] would be flooded by tuna from Papua New Guinea is obviously not true’.[22] Conversely, the fact that new investment in PNG has been generated by the terms of the IEPA re-iterate the long-standing need of liberalised RoO were PNG ever to generate ‘local employment and income’ from the fish in its waters instead of them being exported for processing in third countries.[23]

There are several issues with the substance and logic of the positions promoted by ANFACO and its political allies. Scaremongering around the alleged laundering of IUU-caught fish through PNG-based canneries is contradicted by PNG’s ongoing compliance with the terms of the EU’s own IUU Regulation. On top of this, FFA Members have been demandeurs for a range of enhanced conservation and monitoring, control and surveillance measures at the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC); some of which were blocked by the EU. Similarly, PNG exports must comply fully with strict EU SPS measures, as well as a range of private standards required by EU buyers such as those demanded by supermarkets. 

There is the possibility that Spanish cannery owners are using PNG as a scapegoat for problems in their own industry. For example, the export of Galician canned products fell by 10.5% in volume and 14% in value between 2008 and 2009.[24] In general terms, Spain-based tuna canneries specialise in the production of canned yellowfin for the domestic market and for export to Italy. But PNG does not export canned product to these markets, so trade diversion is not an issue. As a result the argument that global sourcing destabilises Spanish interests is severely weakened. Perhaps PNG is being used as a foil to put pressure on Spanish cannery workers in their industrial relations with management?[25]

Narrow European commercial interests will continue to lobby against the provision of global sourcing. Under the IEPA, parties committed to review the impact of global sourcing three years after its implementation with the possibility of the liberalised RoO being withdrawn. This review clause is being flagged by some EU industry interests as a legal mechanism to resolve its concerns. PNG will likely be the subject of several impact assessments in coming months that will include analysis of the economic, social and environmental effects of global sourcing.[26]  

 

ATPDEA expires, Ecuador pouch producers loose duty free access to US market

The US Congress allowed the extension of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) to expire on 12 February 2011. The ATPDEA has provided tuna processing firms in Ecuador with duty free access to the US market for tuna in pouches (provided the product complies with rules of origin); without the preference, Ecuadorian producers pay a 12.5 percent tariff.[27] Since the expiration of the preferential tariff, US importers have reduced purchases from Ecuador, instead sourcing pouch product from Thailand. Executives from Empesec S.A., the firm processing pouch product for US brand-name StarKist, indicate that deliveries to the US market have fallen 18 percent since the ATPDEA expired. To cope, US customers that are still purchasing Ecuadorian product have agreed to take part in the fee, in some cases splitting it, in other cases, absorbing the fee. Ecuadorian firms are having difficulty selling excess volumes in Latin American markets that are flooded with product.[28]

The Ecuadorian government has requested that the US Congress approve an ATPDEA extension and that the two countries work together on creating a longer-term trade strategy that will offer industry more stability. However, recent events have cast doubt over immediate revitalisation of the ATPDEA. First, the US is rapidly moving forward on a bilateral trade agreement with Colombia, which if concluded will reduce the need for the ATPDEA, of which Colombia is one of the primary beneficiary countries.[29] Second, diplomatic relations between the US and Ecuador are strained. In early April, the Ecuadorian government demanded the departure of the US Ambassador in Ecuador over cables published on Wikileaks; in retaliation, the US also expelled Ecuador’s Ambassador.[30] Tuna industry representatives and government actors have expressed concern that failure to renew the ATPDEA will reduce overall shipments of tuna to Ecuador and place hundreds of jobs in fishing and processing sectors in jeopardy.[31]

 

Fisheries Management

International Seafood Sustainability Foundation and Spanish fleet announce partnership

Further extending its reach in tuna management debates, ISSF has announced a deal to work together with the Organización de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores (OPAGAC) and Asociatión de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores (AGAC), which represents 34 purse seine vessels based in Spain, on issues related to the sustainability of the world’s purse seine tuna fisheries. The partners aim to work collaboratively to develop and promote ‘best practices’ and new technologies that will lessen the impact of fishing on the marine environment. The groups will also combine efforts to advocate for RFMO member nations to address urgent issues such as excess fishing capacity. ISSF announced that that it hopes that this will be the first of many collaborations with fishing industry.[32]

 

Tuna Markets

Fiji regains access to EU market

Almost three years after losing access to the EU market, Fiji has finally received approval from DG Sanco to recommence exporting fish and fisheries products. The EU provides a high value market outlet for Fijian exports of non-sashimi grade fresh-chilled and frozen tuna.       

Fiji was struck from the EC’s ‘List II’ in May 2008, due to deficiencies identified with Fiji’s Competent Authority (CA) in being able to effectively guarantee that Fiji’s fish exports meet the EU’s strict SPS regulations.  The Ministry of Health (CA) has made the necessary improvements to fulfill EU requirements and Fiji is now granted ‘List I’ status, which enables Fiji to export to all EU member countries. 

In June 2009, in addition to issues identified with the CA, DG Sanco’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) inspectors also deemed three of Fiji’s fishing/processing facilities that export tuna to the EU market, to be deficient in meeting EU standards.[33]  These companies are continuing to upgrade their vessels and processing/exporting facilities to address a ‘long list’ of improvements required. Currently, only two companies (accounting for seven vessels) meet the necessary standards[34] and Fiji’s largest exporting company has expressed concerns about the considerable expense incurred in attempting to meet EU SPS standards and the potential for these standards to be used by the EU as a non-tariff barrier to trade.[35]   

Fiji, together with the other Pacific-ACP countries, is currently pushing for relaxed ‘global sourcing’ rules of origin (RoO) for fresh-chilled and frozen fisheries products (HS codes 0304/0305) in negotiations with the EU for a comprehensive EPA, which would enable Fiji exporters to source fish from any vessels, regardless of flag or where the catch was taken.   While Fiji has signed onto the Interim EPA (together with PNG), global sourcing RoO are only offered for canned tuna/cooked loins (HS 1603/1604).  In theory, relaxed RoO for fresh-chilled and frozen tuna exports to the EU, offers great potential to boost the development of Fiji’s export tuna industry.  However, in practice, unless vessels supplying catch to Fiji exporters meet the EU’s very strict SPS standards, the global sourcing provision will be of little value.  Given the political backlash received by the EU from the Spanish fishing industry concerning global sourcing RoO for canned tuna/cooked loins, it is likely that negotiations for similar provisions for fresh-chilled/frozen tuna will also be politically charged.  

 

Tri Marine commences fresh tuna exports from American Samoa

Samoa Tuna Processors, the former Chicken of the Sea canning facility, now owned by Tri Marine, has commenced trial shipments of fresh-chilled tuna from American Samoa to the US mainland.[36]  While Samoa Tuna Processors’ main focus will be canned tuna processing, in an effort to support the local fishing industry the operation will also be processing and exporting fresh-chilled and frozen tuna.  Construction is still underway of Samoa’s Tuna Processor’s reportedly ‘state-of-the-art’ canned tuna processing facility.[37]  

For its fresh and frozen tuna export business, Tri Marine will partner with Luen Thai Fishing Venture, a fully integrated Asia-Pacific based fishing business (head office in Hong Kong) involved in longline operations, vessel servicing, freight and transport logistics, processing and marketing.[38] 

Tri Marine has also signed an agreement (together with Luen Thai Fishing Venture and Yuh Yow Fishery) and the Cook Islands Government, to process Cook Islands’ caught tuna that is landed in Pago Pago.[39]

 

Japanese tuna industry and market feel the impact of March tsunami

The strongest earthquake ever recorded and consequent tsunami have caused serious damage to Japan’s tuna industry. The earthquake and tsunami hit the Sendai area, causing severe damage to harbours, vessels, cold storage and processing facilities and infrastructure in the region, which is known for supplying fresh skipjack and albacore.[40] Japan’s leading seafood companies have been scrambling to account for employees and assess damages following the disaster. Firms reported several facilities are severely damaged and without power and/or flooded immediately following the disaster. Ishinomaki, a major mackerel and skipjack port was reported seriously damaged.[41] All of the vessels of the Kaimaki purse seine fleet have returned to Japan to assist in relief efforts in the regions hardest hit by the tsunami.[42]

The tuna industry has reportedly come to a stand-still due to damage and use of vessels for rescue efforts. The local Japanese albacore fishery, which contributes 10 percent of worldwide albacore catches, is considered closed for the winter season; the closure will have ripple effects into the coming summer albacore season. Albacore prices in the Bangkok market are reported to be near USD 2,850 per tonne, roughly on par with prices in early 2011. It is unclear what effect radiation leaks from damaged nuclear power plants will have on the food safety of fisheries products, if any.[43] In the meanwhile, food safety concerns have impacted regular fisheries market dynamics. For example, the US is diverting all imports of seafood products from Japan for food safety testing.[44] 

Likewise, the disaster is thought to be negatively impacting Malta’s bluefin industry as tuna cold stores in Japan are unreliable on account of electricity rations. Several businesses are predicting a difficult year for the fresh-chilled sector of the tuna industry as it is likely that demand for luxury goods like tuna will crash in favour of concerns over the availability of staple foods and vital necessities take top priority. Fish ranchers in Malta are carefully watching to see how the Japanese economy, and tuna demand, will rebound from the disaster.[45]

 

StarKist faces food safety challenges

The US Food and Drug administration has administered a warning letter to StarKist’s American Samoa plant following an inspection that found that the plant was in ‘serious’ violation of the seafood Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP) regulation as well as out of compliance with some elements of the Thermally Processed Low-Acid Foods in Hermetically Sealed Containers regulations. StarKist responded that it is working to thoroughly address the FDA inquiry in a timely matter and that consumers should be assured that all StarKist products are safe. The firm is not issuing any product recalls or withdrawals. Problems with the HACCP process were specifically attributed to thawing pre-cooked loins in their plastic vacuum packages and keeping them in their packages at elevated temperatures. The FDA requires that StarKist take immediate action to address the problems cited in the inspection report or face further action from the Agency, including seizing product and/or enjoining the firm from operating.[46]

 

Coming in the next issue (April 2011, Vol. 4: Issue 4)

* Greenpeace’s ongoing push to establish the ‘Pacific Commons’

* Pacific Island Countries receive € 8 million for fisheries development under DEVFISH II

 

1 Prepared for the FFA Fisheries Development Division by Liam Campling, Consultant Fisheries Trade Analyst, FFA, Elizabeth Havice, Post-doctoral scholar, Centre for Latin American Studies, University of California-Berkeley, Amanda Hamilton, independent consultant and Manleen Dugald, Consultant - WTO Fisheries Trade Issues, FFA  . Desktop publishing by Antony Price. The authors would like to thank Hugh Walton for his input on an earlier draft of this briefing. The contents of this briefing (including all analysis and opinions) are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the positions or thinking of the FFA Secretariat or its Members.

2 TN/RL/GEN/176, March 1, 2011.Available online  at: http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (symbol: TN/RL/GEN/176)

3 Rapporteur’s Report –  Artisanal and Small-scale Fisheries Contact Group’, March 31 2011.

4 Rapporteur’s Report – Fuel Subsidies Contact Group’, March 31 2011

5 The ‘RFMO-plus’ approach calls for ‘stronger’ criterion attached to special and differential treatment rules for fisheries under international management, based on the understanding that the mere existence of an RFMO obviously does not fulfill the need for adequate management.

6 WTO document TN/RL/GEN/179, 28 March 2011, available online at: http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (symbol: TN/RL/GEN/179)

7 Letter from Fokian Fotiadis, DG MARE, European Commission, to Antonio Schiappa Cabral (Long Distance Regional Advisory Council), 29 November 2009. Subject: LDRAC advice on the interim Economic Partnership Agreement with ACP countries. 

8 As pointed out by the WTO in a report on Fiji: ‘Strict rules of origin on fish exports to the EC have severely restricted export opportunities’ WTO 2009, Trade Policy Review: Fiji, Geneva: WTO, p.84. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp313_e.htm For a detailed overview of these issues in the lead up to the conclusion of the PACP IEPA, see Chapter 6 of Liam Campling, Elizabeth Havice and Vina Ram-Bidesi 2007, Pacific Island Countries, the Global Tuna Industry and the International Trade Regime, Honiara: FFA. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/65kffbc

9 This section is based upon findings from a major new study commissioned by FFA to be published later this year. Amanda Hamilton, Antony Lewis, Mike A. McCoy, Elizabeth Havice and Liam Campling (forthcoming),  Impact of industry and market drivers on the global tuna supply chain, Honiara: FFA.

10 Multiple personal communications with industry representatives, 2006-10. See also,‘No Way For Spanish Tuna Industry To Block EU-PNG Agreement’, Atuna, 3 March 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com/news.html

11 Evidence of earlier lobbying efforts can be found here: Analia Murias, ‘Association looks 'to defend' canning sector’, FIS, 10 February 2010; Analia Murias, ‘Brussels promises to protect canning sector’, FIS, 5 March 2010; Analia Murias, ‘Papua tuna “threatens” EU canning sector’, FIS, 4 June 2010. All available at: http://fis.com

12 Juan Manuel Vietes, speaking as President of Eurothon as cited by Analia Murias 2010, ‘Papua tuna “threatens” EU canning sector’, FIS, 4 June 2010. Available at: http://fis.com

13 Analia Murias, ‘Canning industry has growing concerns over impact of EU-Papua agreement’, Fis, 18 February 2011. Available at: http://fis.com

14 For example, the US-firms Heinz and then Lehman Brothers in Ghana and the Seychelles, and the Japanese firm Mitsubishi in Mauritius

15 The National 2011, ‘EU lauds FNA for Catch Compliance’, 29 March 2011.

16 Based on data presented in Globefish 2010, Tuna Commodity Update, Rome: FAO.

17 See, for example, Analia Murias, ‘Parliament approves trade agreement with Papua and Fiji’, FIS, 20 January 2011. Available at: http://fis.com; EFE, ‘ANFACO: EU Beginning to Realize the Mistake on PNG’, Atuna, 10 February 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com/news.html ; La Voz de Galicia, ‘Galician Canneries Will Close If Papua Agreement Is Not Corrected, Atuna, 21 February 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com/news.html

18 Official Journal of the European Union, Information and Notices, Volume 54, 15 February 2011. 2011/C 48/05, ‘Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The situation of the EU tropical tuna fleet and the challenges facing it’ (exploratory opinion)’. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:048:FULL...

19 ‘Spanish Canners to Fight PNG on Anti-Dumping Charge’, Atuna, 25 February 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com/news.html

20 ‘Trade agreement between the European Union and Pacific countries’, Fishupdate.com, 21 January 2011. Available at: http://www.fishupdate.com; ‘Spanish Government calls for “coherent” agreements with third countries’, FIS, 17 February 2011. Available at: http://fis.com

21 Opinion of the Committee on Fisheries (27.10.2010), for the Committee on International Trade on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Pacific States, of the other part (05078/2010 – C7-0036/2010 – 2008/0250(NLE)) European Parliament, Rapporteur: Carmen Fraga Estévez. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/

22 Radio Australia, ‘EU Trade Commissioner speaks out on PNG and Pacific EPAs’, Pacific Beat, 17 March 2011. Available at: http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacific/

23 Recommendation   (9 December 2010) on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Interim Partnership Agreement between the European Community, of the one part, and the Pacific States, of the other part (05078/2010 – C7-0036/2010 – 2008/0250(NLE)), European Parliament, Committee on International Trade, Rapporteur: David Martin. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/

24 Galcia accounts for 86% of Spanish cannery volume production and 84% in value terms. Analia Murias 2010, ‘Canned product exports’, FIS, 3 February 2010. Available at: http://fis.com

25 La Voz de Galicia, ‘Galician Canneries Will Close If Papua Agreement Is Not Corrected, Atuna, 21 February 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com/

26 Person. comms., September 2010, and January and March 2011. 

27 ‘Deadlock on trade policy in Washington hurts developing country exporters’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, EPAs 15 (7), 2 March 2011. Available at: http://www.ictsd.org, ‘Ecuador requests US to extend trade agreement’, bilaterals.org  24 February 2011. Available at: http://www.bilaterals.org

28 Analia Murias, ‘Due to tariffs, US reduces imports of Ecuadorian tuna’, FIS, 8 April 2011. Available at: http://www.fis.com 

29 Helene Cooper, ‘US and Colombia said to reach trade deal’, The New York Times, 5 April 2011. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com 

30 ‘Ecuador: US expels Ambassador in retaliation’,  Reuters, 7 April 2011. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com 

31 Analia Murias, ‘Due to tariffs, US reduces imports of Ecuadorian tuna’, FIS, 8 April 2011. Available at: http://www.fis.com 

32 Mike Crispino, ‘OPAGAC/AGAC and ISSF sign deal to collaborate on better fishing practices, will work on issues related to bycatch, capacity and better management’, ISSF Press Release, Available at: http://www.intrafish.no 

33 FFA Fisheries Trade News – Oct-Nov 2009, Volume 2: Issue 10 & 11.  Available at:  www.ffa.int/trade_news

34 Fiji Broadcasting Corporation (2011) Only two fishing companies meet EU standards, radio interview, 19 March 2011.  Available at:  www.radiofiji.com.fj

35 ABC-Radio National (2011) European approval for Fiji Fish exports not the end of story, Pacific Beat interview, 16 March 2011.   Available at:  www.abc.net.au/ra/pacbeat/stories/m1971305.asx

36 Radio NZ (2011) American Samoa Fishers May Soon Be Able to Export Fresh Tuna, Atuna, 14 March 2011.  Available at: www.atuna.com

37 Radio NZ (2011) Tri Marine to Start Fresh Tuna Production In Samoa, Atuna, 7 March 2011.  Available at: www.atuna.com

38 For more information on Luen Thai Fishing Venture visit:  www.ltfv.com

39 Samoa News (2011) Tri-Marine to Process Cook Island Tuna in U.S. Samoa, Atuna, 29 March 2011.   Available at: www.atuna.com

40 ‘Earthquake and tsunami destroy important part of Japan’s tuna industry’, Atuna, 14 March 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com 

41 ‘Japan’s seafood companies assess damage’, Seafood Source, 16 March 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com 

42 ‘Kaimaki tuna fleet returns to Sendai for help mission’, Atuna 15 March 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com 

43 Mark McDonald, ‘Food contamination fears could harm Japanese brands’, New York Times, 19 March 2011. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com 

44 Gretchen Goetz, ‘Radiation update: Is Japanese seafood dangerous?’, Food Safety News, 8 April 2011. Available at: http://www.foodsafetynews.com 

45 ‘Japan’s tragedy may leave Malta’s tuna industry reeling’, Times of Malta, 17 March 2011. Available at: http://www.atuna.com 

46 ‘FDA inspection finds violation of health rules at StarKist plant’, Samoa News, 15 March 2010. Available at: http://www.atuna.com 

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